EEG performs independent technical analyses of the suitability of the proposed site; the design of the repository, its planned operation, and its long-term integrity; suitability and safety of the transportation systems; suitability of the Waste Acceptance Criteria and the compliance of the generator sites with them; and related subjects. These analyses include assessments of reports issued by the DOE and its contractors, other federal agencies and organizations, as they relate to the potential health, safety and environmental impacts from WIPP. Another important function of EEG is the independent environmental monitoring of background radioactivity in air, water, and soil, both on-site and off-site. 
SUMMARY
This probabilistic analysis of WIPP TRUDOCK crane failure is based on two sources of failure data. The source for operator errors is the report by Swain and Guttman, NUREG/CR-1278-F, August 1983. The source for crane cable hook breaks was initially made by WIPP/WID-96-2196, Rev. 0 by using relatively old (1970s) U.S. Navy data (NUREG-0612). However, a helpful analysis by R.K. Deremer of PLG guided the authors to values that were more realistic and more conservative, with the recommendation that the crane cable/hook failure rate should be 2.5 x 10 -6 per demand. This value was adopted and used.
Based on these choices a mean failure rate of 9.70 x 10 (1/yr) was calculated. However, a mean -3 rate by itself does not reveal the level of confidence to be associated with this number. Guidance to making confidence calculations came from the report by Swain and Guttman, who stated that failure data could be described by lognormal distributions. This is in agreement with the widely used reports (by DOE and others) NPRD-95 and NPRD-91, on failure data.
The calculations of confidence levels showed that the mean failure rate of 9.70 x 10 (1/yr) -3 corresponded to a percentile value of approximately 71; i.e. there is a 71% likelihood that the failure rate is less than 9.70 x 10 (1/yr). One also calculated that there is a 95% likelihood that -3 the failure rate is less than 29.6 x 10 (1/yr). Or, as stated previously, there is a 71% likelihood -3 that not more than one dropped load will occur in 103 years. Also, there is a 95% likelihood that not more than one dropped load will occur in approximately 34 years.
It is the responsibility of DOE to select the confidence level at which it desires to operate. 
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE OF THE TRUDOCK CRANE SYSTEM
AT THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP) per demand"; that is a reduction of almost a factor of 10. Mr. Deremer makes the point that the NUREG-0612 data were compiled in the 1970s; and he states that the operating environment at WIPP is much less demanding than those for Navy cranes. He also mentions the aggressive inspection and maintenance programs at WIPP, "to assure the continuing reliability of the cranes".
He believes that the failure rates could even be lowered, but states that "it is difficult to quantify this additional improvement".
In his summary Mr. Deremer strongly restates his recommendation of a choice in the data base for the crane cable/hook contribution "of the order of 2.5E(-6) per demand". Mr. Deremer's recommendation was adopted by the authors of WIPP-WID-96-2196. In the key table of that report, on the Crane System Cutset Descriptions, page A2-5, the Event Probability for the Crane Cable/Hook Breaks is listed as 2.5E(-6).
Support for the critical view by Mr. Deremer of the operating experience of Navy cranes may be seen by noting the relative frequencies of equipment failures vs. operator failures reported in "Navy Crane Incidents" (reports obtained from the U.S. Navy), for the recent years 1996, 1997
and 1998 (Table 1 ). The number of incidents associated with operator failure is an astonishing 90 to 95%. This is similar to the data in the "Navy Crane Incidents" reports, with major causes of incidents due to operator rather than equipment failures.
In sharp contrast, in WIPP-WID-96-2196, for WIPP crane system experience, the operators are not the major cause of incidents. As the report states, "Crane operators and load spotters are required to be trained in safe crane operation; therefore it is felt that the WIPP crane performance will exceed the data presented in NUREG-0612, and the estimated failure frequency is felt to be conservative."
CALCULATIONS

Operator Errors
Operator errors are described in the table on page A4-6, of WIPP-WID-96-2196, Rev. 0. For convenience this table is reproduced (as Table 2 ) in this report, with some additions. due to operator error, is 8.31 x 10 (see in Table 3 ). As indicated in Table 3 , the reduced sum of -7 the probability of failure is 9.70 x 10 (1/yr), or approximately, one failure every 103 years.
-3 or approximately one failure every 103 years.
*Note that the contribution of Operator Error is only about 25% of the total.
Use of Confidence Levels
The calculation in Table 3 of the probability of failure doesn't tell the whole story. One also wishes to know the confidence level that is associated with the failure rate of 9.70 x 10 (1/yr). It -3
is helpful to follow the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to include mean estimates and to "take into account the potential uncertainties that exist so that an estimate can be made on the confidence level to be ascribed to the quantitative results." This quotation is taken from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC 1986) . EEG makes the same recommendation, and a calculation of confidence levels is made in this report.
A suggestion of the distribution of HEPs (see Table 2 ) is made by Swain and Guttman Both NPRD-91 and NPRD-95 state that all listed failure rates "estimate" the expected failure rates, and that the "true" values lie in some confidence intervals about these estimates. The following statement is a quote from NPRD-91 (Denson et al. 1991) , page 1-6:
"To give NPRD-91 users a better understanding of the confidence they can place in the presented failure rates, an analysis was performed on the variation in observed failure rates. It was concluded that, for a given generic part type, the natural logarithm of the observed failure rate is normally distributed with a sigma (F) = 1.5. This indicates that 68 percent of actual failure rates will be between 0.22 and 4.5 times the mean value. Similarly, 90% of actual failure rates will be between 0.08 and 11.9 times the presented value."
11.9 0.08 ' 148 7 This is to state that if one wishes to include 90% of all the failure rates, one must include a range of values that somewhat exceeds two orders of magnitude . Under these circumstances, representing the failure rate by a mean value alone disregards relevant information.
Lognormal Calculations
A general form for the lognormal distribution with the two parameters, µ, F is given by (Aitchison and Brown, 1969 ):
where 7 is the cumulative distribution function (CDF).
The median of the distribution is given by:
The mean is given by:
According to the NPRDs (Denson et al., 1991 (Denson et al., , 1994 F is taken as equal to 1.5.
from (2):
since thus:
The values of (EP), the Cutset Event Probabilities, are listed in the right most column of Table 3 .
Let x = 10 • (EP)
; the values of x are listed in Table 4 . Table 4 can be summarized as follows: The failure distribution, P, can be expressed as follows:
The failure distribution, P, has been expressed as the sum of four lognormal random variables, P . The factor 10 is introduced to cancel the 10 used in the columns of to compute the failure distribution functions are described in detail in the Appendix. Table 6 lists the percentile values for the approximating probability distribution of the grand total of the four random variables. For the grand total of the four random variables the approximating and true means and variance are listed in Table 7 without the factor (10 ). The values of the approximations are close to the -3 true values. This indicates that the approximations for the probability values listed in Table 6 have relatively small errors.
DISCUSSION
The data in Table 6 for the probability and the percentiles have been plotted on "probability-log" graph paper; see Figure 2 . Some statements may be made, based on Figure 2 or Table 6 .
(a) The mean failure rate is 9.70 x 10 (1/yr), and corresponds to a percentile -3
value of approximately 71, i.e. there is a 71% likelihood that the failure rate is less than 9.70 x 10 (1/yr).
-3 (b) At the 95 percentile, the probability is slightly less than 30 x 10 (1/yr) (actually -3 29.6 from Table 6 ); i.e. there is a 95% likelihood that the failure rate is less than 29.6 x 10 (1/yr).
-3
(c) The above statements may be recast in another way:
There is a 71% likelihood that not more than one dropped load will occur in 103 years. Also, there is a 95% likelihood that not more 
LIST OF ACRONYMS
The mathematical theorems can be found in many books on operational mathematics. 
Transform Methods
We want to compute the density function for a random variable that is the sum of two independently distributed random variables with known densities. We use the following theorem:
1 Theorem: Let x be a continuously distributed random variable with density f(x), and let y be a continuously distributed random variable with density g (y) . Let x and y be independently distributed. Then the random variable z = x + y is distributed with density h(z) given by the convolution of f and g, which is defined by A related theorem governs discrete approximations to continuously distributed random variables.
Theorem: Let x be a random variable that takes values on the set X = [x , x ,...,x ], with
Let y be another random variable that takes values on the same set X,
A-2 with density g = Prob[y = x ]. Let z be the random variable z = x + y, and let x and y be 
Equations (1) and (2) We apply this theorem as follows. For each of two continuous distributions, (f, g), the probability laws for (x ,y), respectively, we put down a discrete 'grid' of points X = [x ,...,x ] on the real
line, with the points spaced close enough together and over a sufficiently large set to approximate each continuous distribution well. Then we used (f, g) to generate approximating discrete probability distributions for (x, y). For computational consistency, we used the same grid for each random variable under study. We chose the grid carefully to make sure that each random variable as well as the relevant sums were well approximated by the procedure. For each approximating distribution and , we computed the Fourier transform f (T ) and g(T ). Then we computed j j the Fourier transform of { }, the approximating distribution of the sum x + y, as
To compute the approximate density of x + y, , we then inverse Fourier transformed h (T ): j
Computational Details
We implemented these calculations using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and the associated inverse transform, the IFFT. We used the computer language MATLAB on a Dell 450 MHz PC with 128 x 3 K of memory. This permitted us to put down very large and fine grids. We used one (inconsequential) approximation: each time a convolution is computed, the FFT in effect truncates the grid on which the relevant sum is distributed, and restricts it to the same domain on which the original two distributions are defined. In particular, the density of the sum is computed only on the same domain X = [x ,x ,...,x ] , rather than on the true domain Z = 2x ,...,2x ] . To control the error resulting from this approximation, we select the grid set X 0 T-1 very carefully to make sure that it covers the region where the pertinent x, y, and sum z = x + y have appreciable positive probability.
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